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MCDONNELL V. UNITED STATES: 
DEFINING “OFFICIAL ACTION” IN 
PUBLIC CORRUPTION LAW 
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In American politics, the practice of political fundraising has 
blurred the lines regarding what should and should not be considered 
corruption by public officials. The two primary statutes that cover 
public corruption on the federal level, the Anti-Bribery statute1 and 
the Hobbs Act,2 both define illegal corruption as a bribe or kickback 
given to a public official in return for some “official action.”3 In 
McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court defined what 
constitutes an “official action” under these two statutes.4 To craft this 
definition, the Court had to draw a line between benign public 
official-constituent interactions and illegal corruption. The Court 
sought to decide which side of this line a “typical meeting, call, or 
event” falls.5 In an unanimous opinion, the Court sided with Petitioner 
McDonnell, holding that a “normal meeting, call, or event” does not 
constitute an “official action” under both the Anti-Bribery statute and 
the Hobbs Act.6 
The Court’s holding draws a reasonable line between permissible 
conduct and public corruption, but it may have the result of insulating 
public officials from criminal convictions for certain types of 
seemingly nefarious conduct. This commentary will begin by 
summarizing the competing interpretations of “official act” proposed  
Copyright © 2017 Christopher Murphy. 
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1.  18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
2.  18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
3.  See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016) (explaining that the
statutory definition of “official act” in the Federal Anti-Bribery statute is also used to define the 
term “official action” in the Hobbs Act). 
4.  Id. at 2372.
5.  Id. at 2368.
6.  Id. at 2372.
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by the parties, and explain why the Court adopted the Petitioner’s 
interpretation over the Government’s. Part I presents the facts and 
procedural posture of McDonnell. Part II explains the language of the 
statutes in question as well as some of the key precedents interpreting 
what constitutes an “official act.” Part III summarizes the way each 
party wanted the Court to define “official act,” and the arguments 
offered by each party in support of their favored interpretation. Part 
IV explains the Court’s holding and reasoning. Part V analyzes the 
Court’s ruling and predicts how this holding will affect public 
corruption law moving forward. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual Background 
This case arose from alleged criminal dealings between Petitioner 
Robert McDonnell, during his tenure as Governor of Virginia, and his 
former constituent Jonnie R. Williams, Sr., former CEO of Star 
Scientific, a Virginia-based nutritional supplement company.7 
The alleged quid pro quo arrangement between McDonnell and 
Williams in this case involved Williams giving McDonnell and his 
family over $175,000 of value in gifts and loans.8 This allegedly was in 
exchange for McDonnell leveraging the power of his office to give 
Williams access to top Virginia government decision-makers, in order 
to benefit Williams’ company.9 Based on this conduct, the federal 
government indicted McDonnell for violations of the Anti-Bribery 
statute and the Hobbs Act.10 McDonnell admitted to requesting and 
receiving the $175,000 worth of loans and gifts from Williams,11 which 
included, but were not limited to, loans to help the McDonnell family 
manage their rental properties, a Rolex watch, a weekend vacation, 




 7.  Brief for the Petitioner at 3, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, No. 15-474 (Feb. 29, 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
 8.  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 2366. 
 12.  Id. at 2362–64. 
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This case’s controversy was whether, by agreeing to help Williams  
obtain access to top government decision-makers, McDonnell 
provided Williams with a legally sufficient “quo” in exchange for 
these gifts and loans.13 
At the time of these events, Star Scientific was trying to persuade 
independent researchers to conduct studies on the health benefits of 
its nutritional supplement, Anatabloc.14 Initiating these studies would 
have helped Star Scientific receive FDA approval for Anatabloc as an 
anti-inflammatory drug.15 Williams sought McDonnell’s help in 
initiating these studies in Virginia public universities.16 Additionally, 
Williams appeared to enlist McDonnell’s help to add nutritional 
supplements like Anatabloc to the health insurance plan for Virginia’s 
state employees.17 Based on this, the federal government indicted 
McDonnell, alleging that over the course of his tenure he performed 
the following five “official acts” to help Williams promote Anatabloc 
to Virginia government entities: 
(1) arranging meetings for [Williams] with Virginia government 
officials, who were subordinates of the Governor, to discuss and 
promote Anatabloc; 
(2) hosting, and . . . attending, events at the Governor’s Mansion 
designed to encourage Virginia university researchers to initiate 
studies of anatabine and to promote Star Scientific’s products to 
doctors for referral to their patients; 
(3) contacting other government officials in the [Governor’s 
Office] as part of an effort to encourage Virginia state research 
universities to initiate studies of anatabine; 
(4) promoting Star Scientific’s products and facilitating its 
relationships with Virginia government officials by allowing 
[Williams] to invite individuals important to Star Scientific’s 
business to exclusive events at the Governor’s Mansion; and 
(5) recommending that senior government officials in the 
[Governor’s Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss 
ways that the company’s products could lower healthcare costs.18 
 
 13.  See id. at 2365 (“The issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the term ‘official 
act.’”). 
 14.  Id. at 2362. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 2364. 
 18.  Id. at 2365–66. 
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McDonnell did not dispute that this conduct occurred, but did 
dispute its illegality. McDonnell claimed that this was all run-of-the-
mill conduct and that setting up meetings between constituents and 
government officials is something he did “literally thousands of 
times.”19 McDonnell testified that he did not expect the government 
officials to do anything other than meet with Williams,20 and at least 
one such official likewise claimed they did not feel any pressure to do 
anything other than attend the meetings.21 Thus, McDonnell claimed 
that the only “quo,” provided in exchange for Williams’ “quid,” was 
setting up meetings, calling other public officials, and hosting events 
for Williams.22 McDonnell claimed that this conduct was insufficient 
for liability under the Anti-Bribery statute and the Hobbs Act. 
B.  Procedural Background 
McDonnell was indicted for committing and conspiring to commit 
honest services fraud under the Anti-Bribery statute, as well as 
extortion under the Hobbs Act.23 After a five week trial in the district 
court, a jury convicted McDonnell under both statutes and sentenced 
him to two years in prison.24 McDonnell appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit, challenging the definition of “official action” given in the 
district court’s jury instructions.25 
These jury instructions quoted the Anti-Bribery statutory 
definition,26 which defines “official action” as “any decision or action 
on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which 
may at any time be pending, or which may be brought before any 
public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s 
place of trust or profit.”27 Additionally, the district court, at the 
request of the government, instructed the jury that the term “official 
action” included “acts that a public official customarily performs, 
including acts in furtherance of longer-term goals or in a series of 
steps to exercise influence or achieve and end.”28 The district court 
 
 19.  Id. at 2366. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 2363. 
 22.  See id. at 2366 (claiming he did not expect his staff to do anything other than meet with 
Williams). 
 23.  Id. at 2364–65. 
 24.  Id. at 2366–67. 
 25.  Id. at 2367. 
 26.  Id. at 2366. 
 27.  18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012). 
 28.  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366. 
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declined, however, to give McDonnell’s requested set of instructions 
to the jury, which included, “merely arranging a meeting, attending an 
event, hosting a reception, or making a speech are not, standing alone, 
‘official acts,’ even if they are settled practices of the official’, because 
they ‘are not decisions on matters pending before the government.”29 
On appeal, McDonnell argued the instructions given by the court 
were too broad, because the definition “deemed virtually all of a 
public servant’s activities . . . ‘official’ no matter how minor or 
innocuous.”30 
After the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to “clarify the meaning  of ‘official 
act’” in both statutes.31 Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion also addressed 
McDonnell’s additional claims that the statutes in question were 
unconstitutionally vague.32 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The parties disagreed whether the conduct at issue was an “official 
action” for the purposes of federal public corruption law. The text of 
the statutes and precedential cases provided guidance in answering 
this question. 
McDonnell was charged with honest-services fraud under the 
Anti-Bribery statute, and with extortion under the Hobbs Act.33 Both 
charges stemmed from the same conduct—McDonnell’s alleged 
acceptance of bribes from Williams.34 The Anti-Bribery statute forbids 
any public official from receiving or accepting anything of value in 
return for “being influenced in the performance of an official act.”35 
The underlying theory is that a public official who accepts a bribe or 
kickback has deprived the public of their right to the official’s honest 
services. Similarly, Hobbs Act extortion has been construed to cover 
the conduct of a public official receiving a bribe.36 The parties and 
courts agreed that an “official action” was a necessary element of such 
 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 2367. 
 31.  See id. at 2361 (treating the two statutes the same for the purposes of interpreting the 
term “official act”). 
 32.  Id. at 2375. 
 33.  Id. at 2365. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
 36.  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. 
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extortion as well as the federal bribery statute.37 Violating these 
statutes is a felony punishable by significant jail time.38 In this case, it 
was undisputed that McDonnell was a public official who received 
something of value from Williams.39 Therefore, the only legal issue 
considered by the Supreme Court was whether McDonnell’s acts 
supporting Williams and Star Scientific were “official acts” under the 
statutory definitions. 
The parties and district court agreed that the definition of “official 
act” given in the Anti-Bribery statute should also control the Hobbs 
Act analysis.40 The Anti-Bribery statute defines an “official act” as 
“any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, 
proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or 
which may be brought before any public official, in such official’s 
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.”41 
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California42 provided a 
key precedent guiding the interpretation of “official action” in this 
context. There, the Supreme Court held that the “[g]overnment must 
prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official 
and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it was given.”43 This 
is a narrow interpretation of “official act” that forces the government 
to prove that the thing of value was given to a public official in 
exchange for the public official doing a specific, identifiable “official 
action.”44 
This opinion also provided some examples of conduct that might 
seem like an “official action” in the definitional sense, but do not 
count as “official actions” under the Anti-Bribery statute. The two 
examples given by the Court were the President accepting token gifts 
from championship sports teams upon their ceremonial visits to the 
White House, and the Secretary of Education visiting a high school 
and accepting a school baseball cap from the principal of the high 
school.45 These actions could have been found to be illegal under a 
 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See id. at 2366–67 (showing the government requested 10 years imprisonment, and the 
district court actually imposed 2 years imprisonment for violating the statutes). 
 39.  Id. at 2366. 
 40.  Id. at 2365. 
 41.  18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012). 
 42.  526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
 43.  Id. at 414. 
 44.  Id. at 404–05. 
 45.  Id. at 406–07. 
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broader interpretation of “official act” in the Anti-Bribery statute, as 
the President always has before him matters that affect college and 
professional sports, and the Secretary of Education always has before 
him matters that affect high schools.46 The Court determined that 
these actions should not be covered by the statute, and used the 
analogy as support for it adopting the narrower interpretation of 
“official action” that made this conduct permissible.47 
United States v. Birdsall48 also guided the Court’s analysis. In this 
case, the Court clarified that the official who accepts the thing of 
value does not need to be the official who performs the “official act” 
in order for the conduct to be an illegal bribe.49 Instead, a public 
official can violate the statute if he uses his position to provide advice 
to another public official with the knowledge or intent that the advice 
will lead the other public official to perform an “official act.”50 
Additionally, Evans v. United States51 clarified that the illegal 
conduct is the agreement to perform an official action in exchange for 
the thing of value.52 Therefore, it is no defense if the public official 
does not actually perform their end of the bargain.53 In fact, the public 
official does not even have to intend to perform the agreed-upon 
official act.54 It is enough that the public official received a thing of 
value with the expectation that he would perform an “official act” in 
return.55 
III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  The Government’s Arguments 
The Government argued for a broad interpretation of “official 
action,” relying heavily on Birdsall. The Government claimed both 
that the statutory text compelled this interpretation and that 
Petitioner’s proposed narrow interpretation would “radically restrict 
the reach of the bribery laws and allow the purchase and sale of much 
 
 46.  Id. at 407. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  233 U.S. 223 (1914). 
 49.  Id. at 234. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
 52.  Id. at 268 (emphasis added). 
 53.  McDonnell v. United States 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2370–71 (2016). 
 54.  Id. at 2371. 
 55.  Id.  
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of much of what government employee’s do.”56 Additionally, the 
Government disputed Petitioner’s contention that a broad 
interpretation will be a slippery slope opening up any elected official 
for bribery prosecution based on the standard practice of receiving 
campaign contributions in exchange for increased access.57 Finally, the 
Government contended that under Supreme Court precedent, the 
Anti-Bribery statute was not unconstitutionally vague on its face 
when limited to bribes and kickbacks.58 
Using language from Birdsall, the Government argued that the 
Anti-Bribery statute covers “every action that is within the range of 
official duty, including efforts to influence decisions made by 
others.”59 In support of this contention, the Government showed that 
the definition of “official act” refers to “any decision or action, on any 
question or matter, that may at any time be pending, or which may be 
brought before any public official, in such official’s capacity.”60 The 
Government then noted that when “read naturally, the word ‘any’ has 
an expansive meaning,” and that Congress used disjunctive 
formulations such as “‘decision or action’ to ensure the statute had an 
expansive reach.”61 
The Government used Birdsall to show that precedent broadly 
interpreted older versions of the Anti-Bribery statute, which had 
identical language on this point.62 In Birdsall, the Court found that 
two government officers had violated the statute by accepting bribes 
in return for recommending lighter prison sentences.63 The key fact 
for the Government was that in Birdsall, these two officers did not 
have any formal authority over sentencing.64 Instead, they provided 
information and recommendations to their boss, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, who would regularly be consulted by sentencing 
judges.65 According to the Government, this brought the act of merely 
using one’s official position to influence other officials within the 
 
 56.  Brief for the Respondent at 15, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, No. 15-474 (Mar. 30, 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 16. 
 59.  Id. at 20. 
 60.  Id. at 20–21. 
 61.  Id. at 21. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id.  
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scope of “official action.”66 It argued that McDonnell did the same 
thing by setting up meetings between Williams and other government 
officials, and inviting government officials to events he hosted for Star 
Scientific. 
Additionally, the Government took issue with McDonnell’s 
argument that a broad interpretation of “official act” would 
criminalize routine political activity, such as granting access to 
campaign contributors.67 It began by noting that the bribes involved in 
this case were “personal payoffs, not campaign contributions.”68 
Nevertheless, the Government addressed the campaign contribution 
hypothetical by distinguishing formal quid pro quo arrangements 
from the general gratitude and access that often accompanies 
campaign contributions.69 
This distinction relied on the Court’s previous holding that the 
“ingratiation and access” that often accompany political contributions 
were not corruption.70 Instead, these arrangements “embody a central 
feature of democracy—that constituents support candidates that share 
their beliefs and interests, and the candidates who are elected can be 
expected to be responsive to those concerns.”71 The Government 
referred to this arrangement as a candidate’s “general gratitude” 
toward his supporters, and they argue it is not unlawful for this 
gratitude to lead to meetings or actions down the line.72 According to 
the Government, this is unlike a formal quid pro quo arrangement 
where there is a “corrupt agreement” for money to be paid in 
exchange for benefits in the future73: “It is this corrupt agreement, 
made at the time of the campaign contribution, that transforms the 
exchange from a First Amendment protected campaign contribution 
and a subsequent action taken by a grateful official into an 
unprotected crime.”74 Thus, the Anti-Bribery statute and Hobbs Act 
extortion violations were completed at the time of the agreement, not 
when the government official follows through by performing the 
“official act.”75 The Government contended that there was sufficient 
 
 66.  Id. at 25. 
 67.  Id. at 32. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 33. 
 70.  Id. at 32. 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. at 33–34.  
 73.  Id. at 34.  
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 40. 
MURPHY FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2017  9:41 PM 
278 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12 
evidence for the jury to conclude that there was a quid pro quo 
corrupt agreement between Williams and McDonnell.76 
Finally, the Government disputed Petitioner’s claim that the Anti-
Bribery statute and the Hobbs Act were unconstitutionally vague.77 It 
cited Skilling v. United States,78 in which the Court held that the Anti-
Bribery statute was not unconstitutionally vague as long as it is only 
interpreted to cover schemes involving bribes or kickbacks.79 As 
McDonnell failed to identify any justification for overruling Skilling, 
the Government contended the statute cannot be unconstitutionally 
vague.80 The Government similarly disputed McDonnell’s as-applied 
claim of unconstitutionality. Its argument was simple: McDonnell’s 
conduct involved accepting a bribe and thus fell squarely into a 
category of conduct to which the Court in Skilling held the Anti-
Bribery statute could permissibly be applied.81 
B.  Governor McDonnell’s Arguments 
Governor McDonnell challenged both the district court’s 
definition of “official action,” and the constitutionality of the relevant 
statutes both facially and as-applied to his conduct. 
In challenging the definition of “official action,” McDonnell 
argued that these statutes have historically been, and should continue 
to be, construed to apply only to acts that “exercise (or pressure 
others to exercise) the power of the state.”82 He urged that the broad 
interpretation suggested by the Government would be a slippery 
slope, criminalizing normal conduct done by every elected official and 
campaign contributor.83 If his proposed interpretation was applied, 
and “official acts” were cabined to include only exercises of sovereign 
power, McDonnell claimed that his conduct could not qualify as an 
“official action.”84 
The next argument put forth by McDonnell was that United States 
v. McNally85 and Skilling have confined these statutes to their “bribe 
 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 56. 
 78.  561 U.S. 358 (2010).  
 79.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 56, at 56. 
 80.  Id. at 57. 
 81.  Id.   
 82.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 18. 
 83.  Id. at 19. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
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and kickback core,” and that “core bribery” requires agreeing to 
exercise sovereign power.86 Bribery, McDonnell argued, “has always 
meant receiving a reward to pervert the judgment.”87 Thus, the focus 
of bribery law was to ensure independent judgement of government 
officials, not to punish government officials for corrupt self-interest.88 
This is evidenced by the fact common law courts focused their 
analysis on the “perversion” of governmental decision making.89 
Modern courts have also recognized this, as the Court rejected the 
only pre-McNally case to charge an official who never took or urged 
another public official to take governmental action.90 Thus, according 
to McDonnell, he could not have violated the statutes, as he did not 
agree to or actually exercise any government decision making power 
in exchange for the loans and gifts from Mr. Williams.91 
Another major part of McDonnell’s argument was that the broad 
interpretation of “official action” proposed by the Government would 
have disastrous consequences.92 The core of his argument was that if 
“official action” is interpreted to include “anything that could have 
the purpose or effect of exerting some influence,” elected government 
officials would be at risk of indictment any time they provide 
heightened access to contributors.93 To highlight this point, 
McDonnell posited routine exchanges elected officials have with their 
contributors that he argued would now be criminal under the 
Government’s interpretation.94 These routine exchanges included 
posing for a photo with the contributor in exchange for a donation, 
answering a donor’s call to discuss an official policy, or referring a 
contributor to an agency with jurisdiction over the issue of concern.95 
McDonnell urged the Court to avoid this massive upheaval of our 
political process by adopting his proposed narrow interpretation of 
official action.96 
 
 86.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 26–27. 
 87.  Id. at 30 (quoting SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(6th ed.1785)). 
 88.  Id. at 31.  
 89.  Id.  
 90.  Id. at 29. 
 91.  Id. at 29. 
 92.  Id. at 40.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  See id. at 41.  
 95.  Id. at 40–41. 
 96.  See id. at 43 (“This Court should decisively reject that attempt, drawing a clear line to 
prevent future episodes of prosecutorial exuberance.”). 
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Finally, McDonnell urged the Court to declare these “notoriously 
vague” statutes as unconstitutional on their face, or at least in their 
application to his conduct.97 He initially conceded that in Skilling, the 
Court pronounced that these statutes were not unconstitutionally 
vague if constrained to conduct involving bribes and kickbacks.98 The 
problem, according to McDonnell, was that the Government is 
circumventing this limitation in cases like this one by construing 
“virtually everything officials do into quid pro quo bribery.”99 This 
results in an atmosphere where a government official is deprived of 
fair notice of “the line between permissible politics and federal 
felonies.”100 According to McDonnell, the Government’s willingness 
to surpass these judicially created limits illustrates why Congress, not 
the courts, should rework these potent statutes.101 Essentially the 
statutes were argued to have been currently lacking in any legislative 
guidance on how they should be applied, resulting in laws shapeless to 
the point of being constitutionally impermissible.102 
McDonnell also alluded to federalism concerns, claiming that 
federal corruption laws “intrude deeply into states’ authority to 
regulate their officials.”103 He based this argument on McNally, where 
the Court refused to construe the statutes “in a matter that . . . 
involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure 
and good government for local and state officials.”104 Governor 
McDonnell also contended that the vagueness concerns described 
above amplify these federalism concerns, and the combined result is 
federal prosecutors imposing a national code of ethics through case-
by-case convictions.105 
First Amendment issues were also raised by these statutes because 
campaign contributions have been found to be protected speech by 
the Court in the past.106 Essentially, “citizens cannot fully express their 
First Amendment rights to support their candidates and petition 
officials—and officials will be reticent to meet with constituents who 
 
 97.   
 98.  See id at 58 (stating that Skilling confined the law to “the bribe and kickback core”).   
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 18. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  See id. at 59–60 (“Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison . . . 
does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”). 
 103.  Id. at 24. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
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have exercised that constitutional right—if all are under perpetual 
threat of indictment.”107 McDonnell argued that these three areas of 
concern—due process, federalism, First Amendment—combined to 
compel the Court to adopt a narrow interpretation of these statutes so 
that they fully comply with the constitution. 
McDonnell’s as-applied challenge was based on similar grounds. 
McDonnell claimed that these statutes failed to give him fair notice 
that his conduct would be considered criminal.108 This is because the 
wording of the statutes did not make clear that his conduct would be 
covered, and there was no precedent for someone being convicted 
based on this benign conduct.109 McDonnell argued that knowing the 
statutes covered his conduct would have required him to see the 
future.110 Because these statutes and the relevant case law did not 
adequately put McDonnell on notice of the criminality of his conduct 
prior to him engaging in said conduct, he argued it would be 
unconstitutional to convict him based on those statutes.111 
IV.  HOLDING 
The Supreme Court in a unanimous decision reversed the Court 
of Appeals and vacated the convictions of Petitioner McDonnell.112 In 
the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court chose to adopt 
a narrower interpretation of “official act,” and set up a framework to 
analyze future controversies.113 In so doing, the Court rejected 
McDonnell’s constitutional claims, stating that the narrow 
interpretation adopted in the opinion remedied any constitutional 
concerns.114 
The Court began by setting up a framework for the analysis by 
describing two requirements of an “official act”: 
First, the Government must identify a “question, matter, cause, 
suit, proceeding or controversy” that “may at any time be pending” 
or “may by law be brought” before a public official.  Second, the 
Government must prove that the public official made a decision or 
 
 107.  Id. at 25. 
 108.  Id. at 60. 
 109.  Id.  
 110.  See id. (“Public officials should not need to consult Nostradamus to know what federal 
law prohibits, but that is what the Government’s position would require.”). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2734 (2016). 
 113.  Id. at 2367–68.  
 114.  Id. at 2375. 
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took an action “on” that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, 
or controversy, or agreed to do so.115 
Then the Court explained that a normal meeting, call, or event 
like the conduct at issue here was not itself an identifiable “question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” under the statute.116 
The rationale behind this determination relied on the inclusion of the 
phrases “may at any time be pending,” and “may by law be 
brought.”117 The Court determined that those phrases “connote a 
formal exercise of governmental power,” and that the interpretive 
canon noscitur a sociis compelled them to interpret “question, matter, 
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” in the same narrow manner.118 
The Court also determined that by itself, a normal meeting, call, or 
event could not qualify as a “decision or action” on another 
“question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy.”119 Here, the 
Court followed its precedent from Sun-Diamond, which made it clear 
that “hosting an event, meeting with other officials, or speaking with 
interested parties is not, standing alone, a ‘decision or action’ within 
the meaning of [the Anti-Bribery Statute].”120 Instead, a public official 
“must make a decision or take action on that question or matter, or 
agree to do so.”121 However, this does not mean that setting up a 
meeting, hosting an event, or making a phone call can never be 
conduct triggering the Anti-Bribery Statute.122 For example, if a jury 
concluded that this conduct was done as a result of a public officials 
agreement to pressure another official on a pending matter in 
exchange for something of value, that would be illegal.123 
In coming to these determinations, the Court agreed with many of 
the arguments raised by McDonnell. For example, the Court was very 
concerned that the Government’s proposed interpretation would 
open up almost every elected official and their contributors to 
criminal prosecution based on run-of-the-mill conduct.124 Additionally,  
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the Court identified that the Government’s proposed interpretation 
would have raised significant due process and federalism concerns.125 
Finally, having cabined the statutes using the narrow 
interpretation proposed by McDonnell, the Court rejected 
McDonnell’s vagueness arguments. As a result of adopting this 
narrow interpretation, the Court felt the law was now sufficiently 
specific, both facially and as-applied to Governor McDonnell.126 
V.  ANALYSIS 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, 
commentators saw it as an “important test of what kinds of official 
conduct amount to forbidden corruption.”127 In resolving this test, the 
Court drew a logical line and provided much needed clarity into this 
area of the law. That being said, the rule emerging from this opinion 
may not be a perfect remedy to solve the entire problem of public 
corruption. 
Many commentators have lauded this decision for drawing a clear 
line in a previously indeterminate area of the law. According to 
political strategist Larry Ciesler, “it sends a pretty clear signal to 
prosecutors and elected officials as to where the line is.”128 This is 
important constitutionally, as indeterminate rules of law are 
susceptible to the types of vagueness arguments put forth by 
McDonnell. It is also important practically, as this bright line rule 
allows public officials to moderate their interactions with constituents 
to ensure compliance with public corruption laws. This avoids any 
chilling effect that public corruption laws may have on interactions 
between public officials and their constituents.  Now both parties will 
have certainty they will not be criminally investigated or indicted as 
long as they stay within clearly marked boundaries. 
On the other hand, this opinion raises concerns that the bright line 
rule enacted by the Court will lead to the creation of a zone of legally 
permissible soft corruption. This zone would be the area in between 
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the poles of innocent campaign contributions and the general access 
they often provide, and illegal quid pro quo corruption. The idea is 
that an interested constituent could give large sums of money to a 
public official, in the form of a campaign contribution or otherwise, in 
return for the public official generally “being a friend” or supporting 
the constituent in ways that do not trigger the Anti-Bribery statute. 
Indeed this opinion has been described as giving elected officials a 
“blank check to trade gifts for access and ‘unofficial’ favors.”129 
The best example of this type of soft corruption comes from the 
facts of this case. Mr. Williams provided Governor McDonnell with 
lavish gifts, and in return received the benefits of having the Governor 
of Virginia as a supporter. This led the Governor of Virginia to make 
calls, host events, make recommendations, and generally act in 
furtherance of the agenda of a private citizen (and his private 
business). To many lay people, this would appear to be textbook 
public corruption, that should violate the law. Polls showed that most 
Virginians thought Governor McDonnell was guilty, and this public 
condemnation indicates that most people would perceive his conduct 
to be “corrupt.”130 Even the Court found time to call this behavior 
distasteful, although it did so in the process of declaring it legal.131 
While allowing this “distasteful” behavior to persist legally 
appears unsatisfying, there are reasons the Court was probably right 
to do so. Mainly, this zone of permissible soft corruption is probably 
not that large, as conduct by a public official that exerts pressure on 
another public official is still covered.132 Therefore, if the soft 
corruption associated with access and unofficial favors exerts any 
pressure or undue influence on government actors, the conduct will be 
covered by the statutes. But if the conduct does not lead to public 
officials feeling pressure to act in a way differently than they would 
otherwise, then the conduct, while distasteful, did not have the type of 
pernicious effects that Congress appeared to be worried about when 
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If the Court was actually interested in stamping out this soft 
corruption, another option they could have chosen was a third 
interpretation of “official act.” The Court could have chosen to set up 
a flexible standard and largely leave this area of law up to juries for 
case-by-case determinations of what constitutes an “official act” when 
a public official is charged with bribery for setting up a normal 
meeting, call, or event. This would allow a jury of average citizens to 
decide normatively if the actual conduct taken by their public official 
constituted a bribe or kickback based upon the balancing of various 
factors. The types of factors that could be involved in a test like this 
could include the amount of value given by the constituent to the 
public official; the amount of meetings, calls, or events set up by the 
public official for the constituent; the nature of these meetings, calls or 
events such as who was invited/called and the nature of the 
discussions; if any benefit was ever actually construed onto the 
constituent as a result of these meetings, calls or events; and anything 
else the Court thinks is relevant in helping juries determine whether 
this conduct was “corrupt” within the plain meaning of the term. 
The advantage of this kind of case-by-case adjudication is that it 
would allow the federal public corruption statutes to reach 
“distasteful” conduct that looks like corruption, while avoiding 
covering the benign interactions between campaign donors and 
candidates the Court is so worried about criminalizing. For example, 
no reasonable prosecutor would charge, and no reasonable jury would 
convict, a public official for taking a picture with a campaign donor at 
a fundraiser, because this is not commonly thought of as a corrupt 
activity. This would allow prosecutors to focus on finding and 
eradicating improper influence over our public officials, by taking 
away the public officials’ “blank check” for trading unofficial favors 
for gifts of value. 
The main problem with this approach, and the reason the Court 
was probably correct not to adopt it, is that it would probably trigger 
many of the same constitutional and practical concerns of the 
Government’s proposed broad interpretation of “official act.” Case-
by-case determinations would not allow public officials to adequately 
ensure that their interactions with constituents do not cross the line 
into impermissible corruption, as the line may change depending on 
the jury in that particular case. Additionally, a system where 
corruption is not clearly defined could theoretically lead to legally 
dubious, politically motivated prosecutions, for which juries in heavily 
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partisan areas may not be an effective check. However, this should not 
have the same chilling effect on interactions between constituents and 
public officials as the Government’s proposed interpretation of 
“official act.” Under this system public officials should only be 
concerned with interactions with constituents that might be viewed as 
corrupt or improper. Thus, this system should only chill interactions 
between public officials and constituents at the margins of 
permissibility, which leaves out innocent, run-of-the-mill interactions 
between public officials and constituents the Court was particularly 
worried about criminalizing. 
Ultimately, the Court was probably correct in its interpretation of 
the federal public corruption statutes, leaving out this type of soft 
corruption. It does not necessarily follow however, that this conduct is 
not bad for society and should not be illegal. Alternatively, this case 
actually highlights many of the exact reasons why this conduct is in 
fact bad for society, and should be against the law. 
The Court correctly left this issue to Congress, who as the 
lawmaking body is the proper institution to make these normative 
decisions. Thus far, Congress has made the normative judgment that 
public corruption laws should only extend to cases of quid pro quo 
bribery and kickbacks. Hopefully this case does not signal the end of 
the development of the law in this and instead works to spur new 
debate and possibly legislation regarding the proper relationship 
between public officials and their private constituents. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case the Court had to choose between two competing 
interpretations of the law, that would have drastically different effects. 
The Court chose the interpretation drawing a reasonable and logical 
line, limiting practical and constitutional concerns from a previously 
broad rule. This may not come without a downside. Public officials 
and constituents may now feel emboldened to engage in conduct that 
many would consider “corrupt,” but is now legally deemed 
permissible. 
 
